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INTRODUCTION
Good artists copy; great artists steal.1
Copying is the basis for new expression.2  In order to create original
expression, authors enter the copy-expression cycle.3  First, an author ex-
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Frost School of Music; B.M. and B.S., Belmont University.  The author would like to thank
Professor Jessica Litman.  Beyond her exhaustive feedback, Professor Litman constantly
challenged me to strive for excellence.  The author also thanks the Michigan Business and
Entrepreneurial Law Review, particularly all of the Associate Editors for their tireless work.
Finally, the author thanks his wife for her unconditional love, his family for their endless
support, and his friends for their wit.  This note is dedicated to the author’s mother: thank
you for always advocating for my education.
1. Triumph of the Nerds: The Television Program Transcripts: Part III, PBS, http://
www.pbs.org/nerds/part3.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2015) (Steve Jobs stating “I mean Picasso
had a saying he said good artists copy great artists steal.”).
2. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966-67 (1990) (“[T]he
very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and recombination than it is
to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea . . . This is not parasitism: it is the essence of
authorship.”).
3. See Reynaldo Sanchez, Unfair? The Unique Status of Sound Recordings Under
U.S. Copyright Law and its Impact on the Progress of Sample-Based Music, 12 J. MUSIC &
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periences the expression of another author.4 Second, the author–either in-
tentionally or coincidentally–reproduces that expression.5  Third, the
author transforms that reproduction into a derivative product.6  Finally,
the author expresses themselves based on that derivative product.7  This
last step of expression is what consumers identify as a new work.
But this practice of creation raises questions that run to the heart of
copyright law.  How much copying is too much copying?  Is this just a
quantitative inquiry or is it also qualitative?  Is this a subjective or objec-
tive standard?  From whose perspective do we ask such questions?  Do we
only consider expression or do we also consider ideas?  Does the order we
ask these questions matter?  Are these questions for the judge or for the
jury to decide?
Since the inception of federal copyright law, courts have developed the
doctrine of substantial similarity to address these questions.  The substan-
tial similarity inquiry asks whether the works at issue are, as the name
implies, substantially similar–whether the defendant appropriated a mate-
rial amount of the plaintiff’s original expression.8  However, the exact
threshold between a substantial and an insubstantial similarity is difficult,
if not impossible, to express.9  This threshold becomes even more difficult
to define when the alleged infringement involves abstract, non-literal simi-
larities as compared to literal similarities.10
Scholars have identified three discrete tests for substantial similarity,
each with jurisdiction-specific exceptions.11  Some jurisdictions employ
more than one of these tests.12  Scholars argue that the “plethora of [sub-
ENT. INDUSTRY EDUCATORS ASS’N 13, 24-26 (2012) (describing cycle of copying that





8. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
9. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“Nobody
has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”).
10. Take the example of a defendant-songwriter that copies aspects of a plaintiff’s pre-
existing song.  Whether the defendant copied “too much” is an easy question to answer if the
defendant copied all of the plaintiff’s song’s melody and lyrics.  This question is at least some-
what more difficult to answer if the defendant only copied the hook of the plaintiff’s song.
The defendant would have literally copied aspects of a work: the work’s actual melody, lyric,
or text.  Whether the defendant copied “too much” is the most difficult to answer if the
defendant only copied the song’s feel.  The defendant would have non-literally copied aspects
of a work: the work’s general structure, theme, plot, characters, and groove.
11. See, e.g., Katherine Lippman, The Beginning of the End: Preliminary Results of an
Empirical Study of Copyright Substantial Similarity Opinions in the U.S. Circuit Courts, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REV. 513, 525 (2013) (categorizing the tests into three groups: the ordinary
observer test, the extrinsic/intrinsic test, and the abstraction-filtration-comparison test).
12. The Second Circuit, for example, applies one test, the ordinary observer test, to the
majority of copyrighted works. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69.  However, the Second Cir-
cuit also applies another test, the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, in the context of
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stantial similarity] tests and the lack of clear guidelines has led to confu-
sion in the courts”13 and that, given the federal nature and broad scope of
U.S. copyright law, a uniform test is needed.14
Consistency and clarity is a goal of any legal system.15  People and
businesses cannot conform their behaviors to laws that are unpredictable.
To the extent that copyright law attempts to regulate behavior, it needs to
reflect some degree of predictability.  In this respect, U.S. copyright law is
frustrating.  Although the Copyright Act is comprehensive in scope, it is
silent on the basic elements of copyright infringement.  The basic question
of “how much copying is too much” is no exception—the Copyright Act
offers no real substantive guidance on the point.  This ambiguity is made
worse, scholars argue, by the substantial similarity circuit split.16
There is, however, a difference between an unnecessarily unpredict-
able rule that elicits conflicting behavior and a necessarily open-ended
standard that refines behavior.  The question “how much copying is too
much” is open-ended.  This is not a flaw in the substantial similarity in-
quiry.  The substantial similarity inquiry’s open-ended nature17 allows for
flexibility in evolving social norms; it injects community morals into a cop-
yright infringement suit18  Further, beyond theoretical arguments, empiri-
computer programs. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir.
1992).
13. Jaime Walsh, No Justice for Johnson? A Proposal for Determining Substantial Sim-
ilarity in Pop Music, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 261, 306 (2006); see also Alan Korn,
Issues Facing Legal Practitioners in Measuring Substantiality of Contemporary Musical Ex-
pression, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 489, 494-98 (2007) (discussing the “continu-
ing split between the circuit courts regarding which legal standard to use when measuring the
substantiality of innovative or challenging artistic works”); Lippman, supra note 11, at 515
(“[D]ifficulty results from the lack of a single substantial similarity test employed throughout
the circuits”); Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation of Assessing
Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1375, 1385 (2008)
(“Currently, there is a split in the circuit courts regarding which test is proper for assessing
whether protectible elements in a work are substantially similar in a copyright infringement
claim.”); but see Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement,
57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 740 (2010) (“[T]he fact that almost every circuit has
adopted some version of the Arnstein-Krofft test means that it would be difficult to persuade
courts to do exactly the opposite. While the Supreme Court presumably could do so, the
absence of a circuit split makes it unlikely the Court will take the issue.”) [collectively, here-
inafter, Substantial Similarity Circuit Split Analysis Materials].
14. See Substantial Similarity Circuit Split Analysis Materials, supra note 13.
15. See David S. Welkowitz, The Virtues and Vices of Clarity in Trademark Law, 81
TENN. L. REV. 145, 184 (2013) (arguing for the importance of predictability in trademark
law).
16. See Substantial Similarity Circuit Split Analysis Materials, supra note 13.
17. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (noting that nobody has been able to fix the boundary
between a taking of expression and a taking of idea, and “nobody ever can”).
18. See Jason Solomon & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Introduction the Civil Jury As A
Political Institution, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 715, 723, 727 (2014) (describing Jeffrey Abram-
son’s argument for juries, specifically that when “the [civil] jury fairly reflects the diversity of
the community . . . [the jury can] fulfill both an adjudicative and a political role-adjudicative
insofar as the collective decision of the jury in fact resolves the case, and political insofar as
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cal data suggests that the different tests for substantial similarity do not
even lead to different outcomes.19
This Note is organized as follows.  Part I discusses the historical devel-
opment of the substantial similarity inquiry and its role in a Plaintiff’s
prima facie case of copyright infringement.  Part II evaluates more recent
developments in the substantial similarity inquiry.  Part III argues that the
various standards that lower courts have developed are themselves sub-
stantially similar to each other.  This analysis is in line with the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Kohus.20  Although largely ignored by the scholarly
community, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kohus got it right.
I. RISE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY INQUIRY
This part of the Note follows the development of the substantial simi-
larity inquiry in the United States.  The historical progress of the substan-
tial similarity inquiry highlights the evolving nature of copyright law
relative to developments in society and, in specific, technology.  With the
advent of new consumer technologies like radio, television, movies, sound
recordings, and, ultimately, computers, courts faced novel issues that
tested the limits of what exactly “substantially similar” meant.21  One as-
pect of the substantial similar inquiry, however, remained constant: the
primary goal of filtering out unoriginal, unprotected material.22
A. Historical Development
This section of the Note provides an overview of how the substantial
similarity inquiry developed.  Although the substantial similarity inquiry
the jurors’ deliberations across demographic and attitudinal boundaries to reach a common
consensus on a just outcome is itself political,” and Heather Gerken and Valerie Hans’ argu-
ment for juries as “performing an appropriate and useful function in injecting community
values”); see also Hans Zeisel, The Debate over the Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, 1990
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25 (1990) (“[T]he primary contribution of the jury is to inject into the
decision process the community’s sense of justice. We found that in some 20 percent of civil
jury trials, judge and jury come to a different decision on liability; in the majority of these
cases, the jury reached a different decision precisely because its own ‘sense of justice’ differed
from that of the judge.”); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)
(“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute them-
selves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting supporters of the
convention viewed trial by jury as a “valuable safeguard to liberty”).
19. See Lippman, supra note 11, at 545 (“Remarkably, however, when collapsing the
six substantial similarity tests into the three main tests—the ordinary observer test, the ex-
trinsic/intrinsic test, and the abstraction-filtration-comparison test—their substantial similar-
ity win rates become closely aligned.”).
20. See Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 853-57 (6th Cir. 2003).
21. See, e.g., Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120 (movie); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at
706 (computer).
22. See, e.g., Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprise, 471 U.S. 539, 581 n.2 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (noting that substantial similarity, along with Section 102(b) and fair use,
serves to separate protected from unprotected material).
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progressed slowly under the initial 1790 Copyright Act,23 courts ultimately
developed aspects of the inquiry–like the materiality requirement24–that
are still fundamental today.
The first U.S. copyright case to expressly address any sort of substanti-
ality inquiry was Blunt v Patten.25  While comparing the two works at is-
sue, the Court took into account the process by which the defendant
copied aspects of the plaintiff’s copyrighted chart.26  The Court held that
the amount of the defendant’s appropriation had risen to “substantial”
copying.27
Courts continued to recognize “that the whole of a work” need not be
copied to constitute copyright infringement.28  The quantitative measure
of a copy was not the only factor to consider.  Courts recognized that qual-
itative measures, such as the “value of the materials taken,” also played a
role in the substantiality inquiry.29  In 1878, the Supreme Court solidified
these perspectives in Perris v. Hexamer.30  The Court held that the sub-
stantiality inquiry advances a materiality requirement.31  If the amount
copied was quantitatively and qualitatively immaterial–and thus de
minimis32—the defendant would not have infringed the plaintiff’s
copyright.33
For more than 100 years after the first copyright act, however, the sub-
stantial similarity inquiry appeared to be more so a “you know it when you
see it” form of analysis than a principled one.  It was not until the 20th
century that courts began to articulate workable tests.  It was during this
period that Congress altered the procedural rules of litigation.34  These
23. The 1790 Copyright Act, for example, only protected against verbatim reproduc-
tion. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1790) (copyright owners “shall have the sole right and liberty of printing,
reprinting, publishing and vending such map, chart, book or books”).  The 1790 Copyright
Act did not recognize an exclusive right of derivation. See id.  Although, as this section
points out, some sort of substantial similarity inquiry was not necessarily irrelevant under the
1790 Copyright Act, the statute inherently restricted much of the early substantial similarity
inquiry’s development.
24. See Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675-76 (1878).
25. 3 F. Cas. 762, 762 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
29. Id.
30. See Perris, 99 U.S. at 675-76 (1878) (addressing copyright infringement of plain-
tiff’s New York City maps); see also Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
31. Perris, 99 U.S. at 675-76.
32. See Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511, 520 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847)
33. See Perris, 99 U.S. at 675-76 (“A copyright gives the author . . . the exclusive right
of multiplying copies of what he has written or printed. If [sic] follows that to infringe this
right a substantial copy of the whole or of a material part must be produced.”).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1909) (“the proceedings for an injunction, damages, and profits,
and those for the seizure of infringing copies, plates, molds, matrices, and so forth, aforemen-
tioned, may be united in one action”); see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, 3 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT
§ 9:114 (Westlaw 2016) (“Procedural rules also had an important impact. Although the 1909
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procedural amendments allowed for increased dispositive pre-trial mo-
tions, such as summary judgment.35  Further, by this point, Congress had
given copyright owners a right that was not recognized under the original
1790 Copyright Act: the right to create adaptations.36  Courts during this
period attempted to use the substantial similarity inquiry together with
summary judgment as a mechanism to dismiss disputes before trials.37
Under the 1909 Copyright Act, courts expressed the view that substan-
tial similarity is a question asked from a lay spectator.38  The court in Dy-
mow described the threshold for when copying passes from lawful to
unlawful as when “ordinary observation would cause [the copy] to be rec-
ognized as having been taken from the work of another.”39  In support of
its test, the court reasoned that copyrights are “made for plain people.”40
Twenty years later, the Second Circuit in Arnstein further clarified this
point with the ordinary observer test.41  The court evaluated the issue of
“unlawful appropriation.”42  Under Arnstein, the issue of unlawful appro-
priation–also known as substantial similarity–was a test that was based on
“the response of the ordinary lay hearer.”43
As the scope of copyright protection expanded beyond mere verbatim
copying, courts faced the issue of how to identify actionable non-literal
Copyright Act abolished the distinction between law and equity in copyright cases, it was not
until 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, that the distinction was
abolished for other forms of litigation. After that date, the circumstances under which sum-
mary judgment could be granted . . . received a great deal of attention” (FED. R. CIV. P.
(1938)); James R. Maxeiner, Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure: Historical and Compar-
ative Reflections on Iqbal, A Day in Court and A Decision According to Law, 114 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1257, 1277 (2010) (noting the 1938 rules “essentially eliminated” the need for notice
pleading).
35. See PATRY, supra note 34.
36. 17 U.S.C. §1(b) (1909) (exclusive right to translate literary works, dramatize non-
dramatic works, convert dramatic works into nondramatic works, adapt musical works, and
execute models of works of art); see also Jessica Litman, Silent Similarity, 14 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 11, 17-18 (arguing that courts expanded the reproduction right’s scope to in-
clude substantially similar copies in “response to the narrow wording of the adaptation and
public performance rights”).
37. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 475 (2d Cir. 1946) (reversing lower
court’s grant of summary judgment).
38. See Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926) (copyright infringement case
involving copying of a play’s plot); see also Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1138
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (“it is a piracy, if the appropriated series of events, when represented on
the stage, although performed by new and different characters, using different language, is
recognized by the spectator, through any of the senses to which the representation is ad-
dressed, as conveying substantially the same impressions to, and exciting the same emotions
in, the mind, in the same sequence or order.”).
39. Dymow, 11 F.2d at 692.
40. Id.
41. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (involving alleged infringement of a song’s melody).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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similarities.  The Second Circuit in Nichols44 noted that, when describing a
work in its “increasing generality,” there is “a point in this series of ab-
stractions where [non-literal similarities] are no longer protected, since
otherwise the [author] could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended.”45  The court in
Nichols did not define the exact point where non-literal similarities be-
come so abstract that they are no longer actionable, and “nobody ever
can.”46  However, the court in Nichols did, importantly, recognize the pos-
sibility of actionable non-literal similarities.  Although not a literal, exact
copy of a play, copying aspects like a play’s plot could still rise to the level
of unlawful appropriation.47
Although a strong first step, the court in Nichols did not address the
issue of how to distinguish protected from unprotected elements.  In re-
sponse to this void, the Ninth Circuit developed an extrinsic/intrinsic
test.48  In Krofft, the court first asked whether there was substantial simi-
larity in ideas: the extrinsic step.49  This extrinsic step allowed the court to
evaluate works with a high degree of similarity in unprotected elements.50
Further, if the plaintiff succeeded in establishing the extrinsic step, the
court required that the trier of fact decide whether there was “substantial
similarity in the expressions of the ideas:” the intrinsic step.51  Thus, the
extrinsic step lowered the bar on plaintiffs to survive dispositive pre-trial
motions.
Courts interpreting the 1909 Copyright Act responded to the advent of
advancing legal technologies (notably, summary judgment)52 and con-
sumer technologies (such as radio, television, film, and phonograph
records).53  This practice continued under the 1976 Copyright Act.  In
44. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (the plaintiff claimed that the defendant copied a material
amount of the plaintiff’s play, specifically the play’s plot, characters, and theme).
45. Id.  But see Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) (Judge Easter-
brook noting that “[s]ometimes called the ‘abstractions test,’ Hand’s insight [in Nichols] is
not a ‘test’ at all. It is a clever way to pose the difficulties that require courts to avoid either
extreme of the continuum of generality.”).
46. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
47. See id. at 121-23.
48. The Second Circuit would also go on to develop its own refinement of the ordinary
observer test: the more discerning observer test.  Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California,
937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991). This test is discussed in further detail below.
49. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1162-63 (9th Cir. 1977).
50. In Krofft, the plaintiff was the creator of H.R. Pufnstuf, a children’s TV show. Id.
at 1161.  The defendant was McDonald’s, a hamburger restaurant chain. Id. at 1161-2. After
establishing the new extrinsic/intrinsic test, the court held that the defendant’s advertisement
campaign was substantially similar to the plaintiff’s work and, thus, infringed the plaintiff’s
copyright. Id. at 1167.
51. Id. at 1164.
52. See FED. R. CIV. P. (1938) (unifying suits in equity and at law as well as replacing
demurrer with motion to dismiss).
53. See Litman, supra note 36, at 13-14.
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1980, two years after the 1976 Copyright Act took effect, Congress
amended the statute to expressly protect computer programs.54  Congress’
choice to protect computer programs was not–and to some extent, still is
not–an obvious one.55  Computer programs are utilitarian by nature.56
The issues that the courts in Nichols and Krofft addressed became even
more vivid when courts had to figure out how to protect seemingly unpro-
tectable material in computer programs.  In Altai57, the court adopted a
three-part abstraction-filtration-comparison test.58  Largely a refinement
on how the court in Nichols conceptualized non-literal similarities, the test
in Altai allowed the court to separate protected from unprotected material
in a computer program.
B. Prima Facie Case of Copyright Infringement
The substantial similarity inquiry is but one part of a larger test.  In
order to survive dispositive pre-trial motions, such as summary judgment,
a Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement.59
To establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must
prove “(1) protected subject matter; (2) ownership by plaintiff of the right
alleged to have been infringed at the time it was infringed;” (3) actual
copying; and (4) copying “of a material amount of expression.”60  The
54. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028; see also Apple Com-
puter v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983) (recognizing computer programs
as protected subject matter); FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS 32 (1978) [hereinafter cited as “CONTU”], http://files.eric.ed.gov/
fulltext/ED160122.pdf.
55. See CONTU, supra note 54 (Commissioner John Hersey dissent).
56. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992) (cit-
ing SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F.Supp. 816, 829 (M.D.Tenn.1985))
(“The essentially utilitarian nature of a computer program further complicates the task of
distilling its idea from its expression.”).
57. In Altai, the plaintiff alleged unlawful appropriation over the plaintiff’s computer
program’s structure. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d, at 700.  The court held that the non-literal similari-
ties were not substantially similar. Id. at 715.
58. Id. at 706; see also Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d
1222, 1248 (3d Cir. 1986) (“We hold that (1) copyright protection of computer programs may
extend beyond the programs’ literal code to their structure, sequence, and organization.”).
59. Plaintiffs always carry the burden of proving copyright infringement.  Keeler Brass
Co. v. Cont’l Brass Co., 862 F.2d 1063, 1065-66 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that only the burden
of production shifts to defendants once plaintiffs establish their prima facie case of copyright
infringement).
60. PATRY, supra note 34, § 9:4; see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471
U.S. 539, 548 (1985)) (“[t]o establish infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) owner-
ship of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are origi-
nal.”).  William Patry’s four elements are subdivisions of the elements articulated in Feist.
See id.  Patry divides “ownership of a valid copyright” into “protected subject matter” and
“ownership of a right.” See PATRY, supra note 34, § 9:4.  Further, Patry divides “copying of
constituent elements of the work that are original” into “actual copying” and copying “of a
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fourth element, copying a material amount of expression, is the substantial
similarity inquiry.
The first element—protected subject matter—is purely legal.  The first
element ensures that copyright law actually protects the material that the
plaintiff is claiming the defendant infringed.  Without this element, a plain-
tiff could claim copyright infringement of anything, including ideas.  This is
not a trivial result; ideas are often the “building blocks of creativity.”61
An author that has the power to exclude others from using ideas would be
able to block subsequent original works beyond those that unlawfully in-
corporate the author’s protected expression.62  This would be at odds with
copyright law’s goal of fostering social progress via dissemination of new
works.63
Similarly, the second element—ownership by plaintiff of the right al-
leged to have been infringed at the time it was infringed—is procedural in
nature.  The second element ensures that the person claiming to have been
harmed was actually capable of being harmed.  This is a standing require-
ment baked into a plaintiff’s prima facie case.64  Without this requirement,
anyone could bring a copyright claim for anyone else’s copyright.65  Thus,
the standing requirement protects “an alleged infringer from a multiplicity
of law suits” while safeguarding the “rights of the other owners of the
copyright.”66
The third element—actual copying—is pragmatic.  The actual copying
requirement filters out material that was independently created.67  With-
material amount of expression.” See id. Each element achieves different legal and policy
objectives, which I describe in more detail below.
61. See N. Coast Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“This court there grappled with the long-standing problem of how to reward creativity with-
out inhibiting the free use of the ideas that are the building blocks of creativity.”).
62. See id.
63. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries”) (emphasis added).
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (“the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a
copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right
while he or she is the owner of it”).
65. See Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 32 n.3 (2d Cir.
1982) (“[w]e do not believe that the Copyright Act permits holders of rights under copyrights
to choose third parties to bring suits on their behalf”).
66. Wenjie Li, Standing to Sue in Another’s Shoes: Can an Assignee of an Accrued
Copyright Infringement Claim with No Other Interest in the Copyright Itself Sue for the In-
fringement?, 28 PACE L. REV. 73, 78 (2007); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 159 (1976)
(noting that the standing requirement “enables the owner of a particular right to bring an
infringement action in that owner’s name alone, while at the same time insuring to the extent
possible that the other owners whose rights may be affected are notified and given a chance
to join the action”).
67. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, (1991) (em-
phasis added) (citing Melville Nimmer & David Nimmer, 1 COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01[A], [B]
(1990)) (“Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was indepen-
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out actual copying, copyright law would require authors to conduct a prior
art search before they gain copyright protection.68  A prior art search is
not a foreign concept to intellectual property law.69  Before an inventor
gains patent protection, the patent office conducts a prior art search to
ensure, among other things, that the inventor’s claimed invention is
novel.70  A prior art search, however, would not be practicable for creative
works.71  Not only are more copyrights registered with the copyright office
than patent claims with the patent office,72 but also the very nature of a
creative work restricts any truly practicable means of a prior art search73
If it is infeasible for the copyright office to conduct a prior art search,
Professor Landes and Judge Posner argue, it is infeasible for authors to do
so.74  As a result, requiring authors to do the grunt work of a prior art
search would be economically wasteful and thus inefficient.75  Therefore,
copyright law does not impose liability for creating a work that, no matter
how similar it is to a prior work, is independently created.  Given that the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving infringement, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant actually copied the copyrighted work.
The fourth element—copying of a material amount of expression—is a
mixture of law and fact.  Within the context of the other elements, it is
much more apparent that this element (substantial similarity) is at the
heart of copyright law.  Substantial similarity ensures that a defendant’s
copying passed the line from lawful to unlawful copying.76  Substantial
similarity thus recognizes that not all copying amounts to copyright in-
dently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity.”).
68. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 86–88 (2003).
69. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015) (patent law’s novelty requirement).
70. See id.
71. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 68.
72. The patent office processes over 500,000 patent claims per year.  U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO (Oct. 2014), http://
www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents (“Patent ap-
plications are received at the rate of over 500,000 per year.”).  The copyright office processed
over 700,000 copyright registrations in 2011.  U.S. Copyright Office, Overview of the Copy-
right Office, COPYRIGHT (last visited April 21, 2016), http://copyright.gov/about/ (“In fiscal
year 2011, the Office processed more than 700,000 registration claims.”).  However, unlike
patents, registration is not a prerequisite for copyright protection. Compare 17 U.S.C.
§ 408(a) (2005) (“registration is not a condition of copyright protection”), with 35 U.S.C.
§ 131 (2002) (“The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the application and the
alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the applicant is entitled to a
patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent therefor.”).  If the copyright office had
to conduct a prior art search before authors gained copyright protection, the copyright office
would need to process much more than 700,000 copyright registrations per year.
73. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 68.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (“unlawful appropriation”).
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fringement.77  Some copying is inevitable, if not socially valuable and en-
couraged.78  Take the example of a songwriter who wants to write a blues.
Given the relatively uniform structure of blues songs, the songwriter will
almost certainly actually copy harmonic, instrumental, rhythmic, and lyri-
cal expression from other blues song.79  Without the substantial similarity
inquiry, only the first person to create a blues song would be able to claim
protection in a blues song.  This person would be able to exclude others
from writing such songs.  Thus, absent the fourth element, copyright law
would impose a novelty requirement akin to patent law.80
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
In Part I, this Note evaluated the role of the substantial similarity in-
quiry in a plaintiff’s prima facie case for copyright infringement and the
historical development of that inquiry.  This part of the Note evaluates
more recent developments in the substantial similarity inquiry.  Because
Congress and the Supreme Court have been silent on the matter, lower
courts have largely been alone in developing tests for substantial similar-
ity.  Given the federal nature of copyright law and the normative import of
predictability, scholars have argued for a more uniform test.81
A. An Unresponsive Congress. A Silent Supreme Court.
The most direct way to resolve a circuit split is for new binding law to
direct courts to a specific answer.  In the United States, this is most com-
monly done either at the Congressional or Supreme Court level.  Neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court, however, have offered any real substan-
tive guidance on substantial similarity.
Although the Copyright Act does not expressly reference the substan-
tial similarity inquiry, Congress is aware that courts engage in the inquiry.
Much of the legislative discussion, however, is limited to just that—recog-
nizing that there is such a thing as the substantial similarity inquiry.82
Congress has expressly deferred to courts to continue developing the sub-
77. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (“Not all
copying, however, is copyright infringement”).
78. See id.
79. Blues songs follow a common twelve-bar blues progression (harmonic) with com-
mon instruments, such as guitars, (instrumental) that play a common shuffle groove (rhyth-
mic) under a common lyrical structure of stating a line, repeating it, varying it, and repeating
the initial variation again (non-literal copying of lyrical expression).
80. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015).
81. See Substantial Similarity Circuit Split Analysis Materials, supra note 13.
82. For example, Congress has proposed amendments to the Copyright Act to clarify
the scope of the substantial similarity inquiry for vessel hull designs. 151 CONG. REC. S10596,
S10600 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2005) (statement of Sen. Cornyn) (purpose of proposed 2005 ves-
sel hull design amendment was “to provide guidance for assessments of substantial similarity,
and for other purposes”).
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stantial similarity inquiry.83  Congress has deferred in part out of a belief
that “no black letter rule of law can be formulated to draw a precise
boundary between substantial similarity and insubstantial similarity.”84
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the need for a substantial
similarity inquiry,85 it has yet to offer much in terms of guidance on the
matter.  The Court in Harper & Row offered the most insight into the
substantial similarity inquiry.86  The Court noted that the substantial simi-
larity inquiry separates protected from unprotected material.87  In separat-
ing protected from unprotected material, the substantial similarity inquiry
helps “strike the difficult balance between the interests of authors and in-
ventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on
83. See H.R. REP. 98-781, at 26 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750, 5775
(with respect to the substantial similarity inquiry as applied to semiconductor chips, “the
committee . . . intends that the courts should have sufficient flexibility to develop a new body
of law” similar to fact-based works).
84. Id. at 27.  Congress has also heard testimony with respect to how businesses con-
form their behavior to the substantial similarity inquiry. See, e.g., Design Piracy Prohibition
Act: Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Committee
on House Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2006 WL 2127241 (statement of David Wolfe, Creative
Director, The Doneger Group) (fashion industry); Database and Collections of Information
Misappropriation Act: Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the
Committee on House Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong., 2003 WL 22206880 (statement of
Keith Kupferschmid, Vice President Intellectual Property Policy & Enforcement, Software &
Information Industry Association) (“the usual standard for determining copyright infringe-
ment is whether there is ‘substantial similarity’ between the allegedly infringing work and the
copyrighted work. However, where databases are involved, the standard is heightened to a
‘virtually identical’ standard.”); Copyright Protection of Information on the Internet: Before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection of the Committee on
Commerce, 106th Cong., 1999 WL 395046 (statement of Frank Politano, Trademark and Cop-
yright Consel, AT&T Corp.) (AT&T requesting clarification that the phrase “substantially
the same” used in a proposed securities act’s definition does not mean “substantial similar-
ity” as used in copyright law so as to “avoid confusion and ambiguity by ensuring that a
copyright law concept is not applied to this statute.”); Copyright Protection on the Internet:
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary,
104th Cong., 1996 WL 50053 (statement of Stephen M. Heaton, General Counsel and Secre-
tary, CompuServe Incorporated) (internet-based companies).  Similarly, Congress has heard
testimony describing the manner in which broadly defined subject matter can impact copy-
right liability via substantial similarity. Fashion Design Protection: Hearing on H.R. 5055
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Judiciary Com-
mittee, 109th Cong., 2006 WL 2265233 (statement of Christopher Sprigman, Associate Profes-
sor, University of Virginia School of Law) (“the substantial similarity standard that is in the
bill now . . . would reach designs that are inspired as well as those that are copied. I think it
would be better if the bill were clearly limited only to those garments that are point-by-point
copies of existing garments.”).
85. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprise, 471 U.S. 539, 581 (1985) (J. Brennan dissent-
ing) (noting that substantial similarity, along with Section 102(b) and fair use, serves to sepa-
rate protected from unprotected material).
86. See id.
87. Id.
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the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas,
information, and commerce on the other hand.”88
Although the Court did not expressly engage in a formal substantial
similarity inquiry, the Court in Feist did follow in Harper & Row’s foot-
steps.89  The Court filtered out the unprotected, unoriginal elements of a
phonebook directory before comparing the two works at issue.90  When
the Court did compare the two works, it recognized that, although the
defendant took a “substantial amount of factual information,” because
that information was unprotected, the copying did not amount to copy-
right infringement.91
Two things are clear.  First, both Congress and the Supreme Court rec-
ognize that lower courts are engaging in a substantial similarity inquiry.
Second, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court have offered much in
the way of substantive guidance.
B. Lower Courts in the Vanguard
Scholars have identified three discrete tests for substantial similarity in
the U.S.: the ordinary observer test, the extrinsic/intrinsic test, and the ab-
straction-filtration-comparison test.92 Each circuit has used one or more of
these tests and promulgated its own take on it.
1. Ordinary Observer
The First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits each follow the
ordinary observer test.  The question is whether the defendant took
enough of the plaintiff’s work such that an ordinary observer’s response93
to the work is to recognize that the defendant “appropriated something
which belongs to the plaintiff.”94
88. Id. at 580 (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984)) (internal quotations omitted).
89. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361-62 (1991). Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 581.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Lippman, supra note 11.
93. The ordinary observer’s subjective response is key to the ordinary observer test.
The ordinary observer test is not asked from the perspective of a lay spectator purposefully
trying to detect similarity.  Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489
(2d Cir. 1960) (emphasis added) (finding that the ordinary observer “would be disposed to”
overlook any similarities in the works “unless he set out to detect the disparities”).  Further,
the ordinary observer test is not asked from the perspective of a lay spectator that has had
the benefit of expert analysis–commonly referred to as analytic dissection.  Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (emphasis added) (“The proper criterion on that issue
is not an analytic or other comparison of the respective musical compositions as they appear
on paper or in the judgment of trained musicians”).  Here, the ordinary observer test is asked
purely from a lay spectator’s subjective response to the works at issue. See id.
94. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Peel & Co. v. The Rug Mkt., 238
F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2001); Wildlife Exp. Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 509
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The Second Circuit has refined the ordinary observer test to include a
“more discerning observer” test for works that have significant similarity
in unprotected material.95  The inquiry is first to expressly separate the
unprotected from the protected material before engaging in an ordinary
observer inquiry.96  That said, using a “total look and feel” analysis, the
trier of fact must still consider the work as a whole.97  The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has yet to expressly address the issue of limiting the
scope of the ordinary observer test to protected expression.98  When
presented with relevant cases, however, district courts in the Fifth Circuit
have begun to adopt the Second Circuit’s more discerning observer test as
a means of filtering out unprotected material from the substantial similar-
ity inquiry.99
(7th Cir. 1994) (citing Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th
Cir. 1982)); O’Neill v. Dell Pub. Co., 630 F.2d 685, 687 (1st Cir. 1980); Universal Athletic
Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975).
95. Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991).  Patry
notes that the more discerning observer test articulated in Folio is important in the context of
the Second Circuit’s prior decisions. PATRY, supra note 34.  In Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu
Limited (Inc.), the court articulated the ordinary observer test in such a way that implied that
the ordinary observer test was not limited to similarity of protected expression.  360 F.2d
1021, 1022-23 (2d Cir. 1966) (focusing substantial similarity analysis first on unprotected simi-
larities and then on the work’s differences).  Thus, the more discerning observer test narrows
the ordinary observer test to comparing protected expression.  This distinction is discussed in
further detail below.
96. See Folio Impressions 937 F.2d at 766.
97. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995) (“It is common-
place that in comparing works for infringement purposes—whether we employ the tradi-
tional “ordinary observer” test or the Folio Impressions “more discerning” inquiry—we
examine the works’ ‘total concept and feel.’ ”) (citing Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field &
Co., 675 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir.1982)).  Or, as Patry puts it, in focusing on the forest and not
the trees, the ordinary observer should still ignore “public domain trees.” PATRY, supra note
34, § 9:137.
98. But see Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1347 (5th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d
Cir.1992)) (“To determine substantial similarity, the court should ‘focus on whether the de-
fendant copied any aspect of this protected expression.’ ”).  In Engineering Dynamics, the
Fifth Circuit did limit the substantial similarity inquiry to protected expression. Id.  How-
ever, the court was applying the Altai abstraction-filtration-comparison test in the context of
a computer program. Id. The Fifth Circuit has yet to apply this narrowed substantial similar-
ity inquiry to the ordinary observer test for cases involving works other than computer
programs.
99. Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 605 (E.D. La. 2014) (“Although the Altai test
has not been extensively employed in its pure form outside the realm of computer program-
ming and other highly technical subject matters, courts throughout the country have bor-
rowed from its structure to add a threshold ‘filtering’ step to the traditional lay ‘ordinary
observer’ test in cases where the plaintiff’s work contains both protected and unprotectable
elements. The Second Circuit refers to this filtering approach as a ‘more discerning ordinary
observer’ test.”); see also R. Ready Prods., Inc. v. Cantrell, 85 F. Supp. 2d 672 (S.D. Tex.
2000) (adopting the more discerning observer test); Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17258 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2000) (adopting the more discerning observer
test).
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Although the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits have not expressly
adopted a separate more discerning observer test, the courts have nar-
rowed the Second Circuit’s ordinary observer inquiry to only evaluate sim-
ilarity of protected expression.  The First Circuit presents the ordinary
observer test as one where the “ordinary reasonable person would con-
clude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protectible
expression by taking material of substance and value.”100  When con-
ducting the ordinary observer test, the Third Circuit requires the fact-
finder to “determine whether the later work is similar because it appropri-
ates the unique expressions of the original author, or merely because it
contains elements that would be expected when two works express the
same idea or explore the same theme.”101  The Seventh Circuit has simi-
larly framed the ordinary observer test as “whether the accused work is so
similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would
conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s pro-
tectible expression by taking material of substance and value.”102
100. Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co., 207 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting
Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir.1988)) (em-
phasis added).
101. Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added).
102. Wildlife Exp. Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 50-09 (7th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.
1982)). (emphasis added).  An indicative example of the Seventh Circuit separating protected
from unprotected material while still engaging in a kind of “total look and feel” analysis is
seen in JCW Investments, Inc. v. Novelty, Inc.:
The pictures show that the similarities between Fred and Fartman go far beyond the fact
that both are plush dolls of middle-aged men sitting in armchairs that fart and tell jokes.
Both have crooked smiles that show their teeth, balding heads with a fringe of black
hair, a rather large protruding nose, blue pants that are identical colors, and white tank
tops. On the other hand, Fartman has his name emblazoned in red across his chest, his
shoes are a different color from Fred’s, as is his chair, and Fartman wears a hat. In the
end, despite the small cosmetic differences, the two dolls give off more than a similar air.
The problem is not that both Fred and Fartman have black hair or white tank tops or any
other single detail; the problem is that the execution and combination of features on
both dolls would lead an objective observer to think they were the same.
482 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Pampered Chef, Ltd. v. Magic Kitchen, Inc., 12 F.
Supp. 2d 785, 791–92 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (quoting Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs.
Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982)) (“While dissection is generally disfavored, the ordi-
nary observer test, in application, must take into account that the copyright laws preclude
appropriation of only those elements of the work that are protected by the copyright.”);
Theotokatos v. Sara Lee Pers. Prods., 971 F. Supp. 332, 341 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (quoting
Fisher–Price, Inc. v. Well–Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir.1994)) (noting that,
in the context of a derivative work, “the court must find a substantial similarity between the
protectable elements of the two works. That is, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
appropriated the plaintiff’s particular means of expressing an idea, not merely that he ex-
pressed the same idea.”); FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1124, 1147 (N.D.
Ill. 1996) (citing Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 141 (2nd Cir.1992) (more
discerning ordinary observer test)) (“Where, as here, the Court is comparing products that
have both protectible and unprotectible elements, we must exclude comparison of the unpro-
tectible elements from the application of the ordinary observer test.”) vacated in part, 108
F.3d 140 (7th Cir. 1997) (vacated for purpose of attorney’s fees); but see Francescatti v.
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2. Extrinsic/Intrinsic
The Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits each follow some form of the
extrinsic/intrinsic test.103  The Ninth Circuit initially established this test in
Krofft.104  The court applied a two-step extrinsic and intrinsic test.105  The
extrinsic test, the court described, was a test for substantial similarity in
ideas.106  The intrinsic test was a test for substantial similarity in expres-
sion as determined by an ordinary observer.107  The fundamental effect,
the court reasoned, was a more thorough analysis that would protect
works with a high degree of similarity in unprotected elements.108
Ultimately, due to inconsistent application of the traditional Krofft
test, the Ninth Circuit in Shaw revised the extrinsic/intrinsic test.109  Now,
under Shaw, the Krofft test’s first step is no longer framed as a comparison
of ideas.110  The first step is instead a comparison of objective aspects of
the plaintiff’s expression.111  Further, the Krofft test’s second step is no
longer framed as a comparison of expression of ideas.112  Under Shaw, the
second step is a comparison of subjective aspects of the plaintiff’s
expression.113
The Eighth Circuit follows the Ninth Circuit’s framing of the extrinsic/
intrinsic test.  Although the Eighth Circuit adopted the Krofft test before
the Ninth Circuit’s refinement of the extrinsic/intrinsic test in Shaw, the
Eighth Circuit requires that courts focus the extrinsic step “on objective
Germanotta, No. 11 CV 5270, 2014 WL 2767231, at *11 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 2014) (although
the court purported to reject the more discerning observer test, the court’s reasoning indi-
cates that it actually rejected the intended audience test).
103. Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987)
104. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1162-63 (9th Cir. 1977).




109. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Because the criteria incor-
porated into the extrinsic test encompass all objective manifestations of creativity, the two
tests are more sensibly described as objective and subjective analyses of expression, having
strayed from Krofft’s division between expression and ideas.”).  In Shaw, the plaintiff, “a
well-known writer and producer in the entertainment industry,” claimed that the defendant,
a former NBC Television executive, infringed the plaintiff’s copyright in the plaintiff’s script.
Id. at 1355.  The court remanded after holding that the plaintiff satisfied the extrinsic test and
thus had “presented a triable issue of fact.” Id. at 1363-64.
110. See id.
111. Id. Objective expression includes aspects like theme, plot, and characters, id. (liter-
ary works), as well as a work’s “subject matter, shapes, colors, materials, and arrangement.”
Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2002) (works of visual art).
112. See Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357.
113. Id.
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similarities in the details of the works.”114  Thus, whatever distinction
there is between the Eighth and Ninth’s Circuit’s framing of the extrinsic/
intrinsic test, it is likely one without a difference.
The Fourth Circuit follows the extrinsic/intrinsic test with two notable
nuances.  First, the Fourth Circuit, like the Eight Circuit, adopted the
Krofft test before the Ninth Circuit’s refinement in Shaw.115  Instead of
comparing a random list of factual similarities, the Fourth Circuit searches
“for extrinsic similarities such as those found in plot, theme, dialogue,
mood, setting, pace, or sequence.”116  Thus, like the Eighth Circuit,
whatever distinction there is between the Fourth and Ninth’s Circuit’s
framing of the extrinsic step, it is likely one without a difference.
Second, and more importantly, the Fourth Circuit asks the intrinsic test
from the perspective of the work’s intended audience, which is not neces-
sarily the ordinary observer.117  In Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, the Fourth
Circuit clarified that works are created for a specific audience.118  Usually,
that audience is the general public.119  In that case, the ordinary observer
test is rightly applied.  In some situations, however, the intended audience
is much more specialized, as is the case with children’s music.120  In that
case, the observer must be viewed from the perspective of an ordinary
child (i.e. the intended audience).121
3. Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison
The Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits each follow the abstraction-filtra-
tion-comparison test.122  As described in section I.A. of this Note, the ab-
straction-filtration-comparison test was first developed in the context of
114. Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing McCul-
loch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1987)).
115. Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 1996).
116. Id.
117. Charles W. Ross Builder, Inc. v. Olsen Fine Home Bldg., LLC, 496 F. App’x 314,
318 (4th Cir. 2012).
118. 905 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting works like computer programs and chil-
dren’s products are not intended for the general public).  In Dawson, the plaintiff owned the
copyright in “an arrangement of the spiritual ‘Ezekiel Saw De Wheel.’ ” Id. at 732.  The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s arrangement of the same spiritual infringed the plain-
tiff’s copyright.  Id.  The court remanded after holding that, before the district court applies
the ordinary observer test, it must first determine “whether the audience of [the plaintiff’s]
work possessed specialized expertise that the lay public lacks.” Id. at 737.




122. Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 854 (6th Cir. 2003); Sturdza v. United Arab Emir-
ates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1297-1300 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (although the Court did not expressly adopt
the abstraction test, it did approve of the district court’s use of the three steps in its reason-
ing); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing
Autoskill Inc. v. Nat’l Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).
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evaluating computer programs for actionable non-literal similarity.123  Al-
though the Altai test has been widely adopted,124 only the Sixth, Tenth,
and D.C. Circuits have extended it beyond computer programs.
The abstraction-filtration-comparison test breaks the substantial simi-
larity inquiry into three steps.  First, in the abstraction step, the court must
arrange a work in its different levels of generality.125  Second, in the filtra-
tion step, the court must separate protected from unprotected elements in
each level of abstraction.126  Third, in the comparison step, the finder of
fact must compare the protected elements of each level of abstraction for
similarity, which is generally asked from the perspective of the ordinary
observer.127
The D.C. Circuit only applies the extended abstraction-filtration steps
to the ordinary observer test when the works at issue share significant sim-
ilarities in unprotected material.128  By contrast, the Tenth Circuit has
used the abstraction-filtration-comparison test in all substantial similarity
inquiries since 1996.129  The Sixth Circuit also uses the abstraction-filtra-
tion-comparison test as its exclusive test for substantial similarity, how-
ever, the Sixth Circuit has one nuance.  The Sixth Circuit asks the final
comparison question from the perspective of the intended audience,
which, as noted above, is generally, but not always, the ordinary
observer.130
4. Undefined
 The Eleventh Circuit has refused to hold itself to any one of the three
primary tests.131  The Eleventh Circuit first used the ordinary observer test
123. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“Among other things, this case deals with the challenging question of whether and to what
extent the ‘non-literal’ aspects of a computer program, that is, those aspects that are not
reduced to written code, are protected by copyright.”).
124. See, e.g., Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1342 (5th
Cir. 1994) (adopting the Altai abstraction-filtration-comparison test).
125. Altai, 982 F.2d at 706 (“In ascertaining substantial similarity under this approach, a
court would first break down the allegedly infringed program into its constituent structural
parts.”).
126. Id. (“Then, by examining each of these parts for such things as incorporated ideas,
expression that is necessarily incidental to those ideas, and elements that are taken from the
public domain, a court would then be able to sift out all non-protectable material.”).
127. Id. (“Left with a kernel, or possible kernels, of creative expression after following
this process of elimination, the court’s last step would be to compare this material with the
structure of an allegedly infringing program.”).
128. See Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1297-1300 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
see also Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying ordinary observer test
in case where there was not an issue of similarity in unprotected material).
129. See, e.g., Country Kids ‘N City Slicks v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996).
130. Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 854 (6th Cir. 2003).
131. Similarly, the Federal Circuit follows the jurisprudence of the circuit from which
the case is taken.  Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (“the Federal Circuit shall review procedural matters, that are not unique to patent
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in a case involving dolls.132  However, at least in the case of computer
programs, the Eleventh Circuit has also used the abstraction-filtration-
comparison test.133  The Eleventh Circuit’s stance on the extrinsic/intrinsic
test is currently unclear.  Although the court approved of a district court’s
use of the extrinsic/intrinsic test in a case involving a motion-picture,134
the court did not recognize the efficacy of the test in a case involving an
architectural design135
C. Scholars Debate
Scholars have addressed various issues with the substantial similarity
tests.  Some scholars have argued for significant procedural overhauls
while others have argued for more focused substantive fixes.
Professors Michael Landau and Donald Biederman addressed the “ep-
idemic of intercircuit splits” with a procedural overhaul.136  The authors
distinguished the different tests for substantial similarity on one key as-
pect: whether the fact-finder had the benefit of expert testimony–of ana-
lytic dissection.137  Tests like the Fourth Circuit’s intended audience test
were exemplary of “lack of judicial expertise . . . and familiarity with copy-
right issues on the part of federal” judges.138  The author’s answer to the
circuit split was for the “creation of a national copyright court.”139  Thus,
instead of a substantive fix, this procedural overhaul would allow for legal
uniformity in the substantial similarity inquiry.140
This proposal is not necessarily bad.  Assuming, however, that there
are actually competing substantial similarity tests that lead to different re-
sults, Landau and Biederman’s proposal of a national copyright court still
does not answer the question: specifically, what is the test for substantial
similarity?
issues, under the law of the particular regional circuit court where appeals from the district
court would normally lie”); see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d
1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Panduit Corp., 744 F.2d at 1575) (“When the questions on
appeal involve law and precedent on subjects not exclusively assigned to the Federal Circuit,
the court applies the law which would be applied by the regional circuit.”).
132. Original Appalachian Artworks v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829-30 (11th Cir.
1982).
133. Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1543-44 (11th Cir. 1996).
134. Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1257 (11th Cir. 1999).
135. Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1224 (11th Cir. 2008).
136. Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for A Specialized Copyright
Court: Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 717, 737,
784 (1999).
137. Id. at 732-33.
138. Id. at 736-38.
139. Id. at 736.
140. See id. at 738.
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Another common approach scholars have advocated for are substan-
tive fixes to specific substantial similarity tests.141  For example, depending
on how confident we are with a fact finder’s ability to recognize similarity,
the ordinary observer test will have the risk of either being over-inclusive
or under-inclusive.  If fact finders have behavioral biases that cause them
to incorrectly find material similarities, then the ordinary observer test will
be over-inclusive.142  By contrast, if fact finders are oblivious to material
similarities, then the ordinary observer test will be under-inclusive.  Thus,
one response to this issue is to educate the fact finder as to how a learned
ordinary observer would identify similarity.143
There are two issues with the “educate-the-fact-finder” argument.
First, it presupposes that the person educating the fact finder (the “educa-
tor”) knows what substantial similarity is.  If only the fact finder knew as
much about music, visual art, and novels as the educator did, the reasoning
goes, the fact finder would rightly identify substantial similarity.  But this
rhetoric does nothing more than shift the definition of substantial similar-
ity.  Currently, the ordinary observer test defines substantial similarity as
being enough similarity such that a reasonable, lay spectator would recog-
nize the subsequent work as having appropriated expression from the
prior work.144  Educating the fact finder would instead define substantial
similarity as having enough similarity such that the educator—or, more
specifically, the most believable expert at trial—would recognize the sub-
sequent work as having appropriated expression from the prior work.145
Second, the “educate-the-ordinary-observer” argument presupposes
that substantial similarity is an objective inquiry.  Substantial similarity is
not an objective, binary inquiry; there is no hard threshold that, once
passed, the defendant can be said to have copied too much.146 Substantial
similarity is a subjective standard.  This is not a flaw in the inquiry.  The
141. See, e.g., Jamie Lund, Fixing Music Copyright, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 104-06
(2013) (arguing juries should use surveys of how “fluent musicians” evaluate the similarity of
the music at issue); Yvette Joy Liebesman, Using Innovative Technologies to Analyze for
Similarity Between Musical Works in Copyright Infringement Disputes, 35 AIPLA Q. J. 331,
334–35 (2007) (arguing courts should use technology, such as the music genome project, to
determine unlawful appropriation); Stephanie J. Jones, Music Copyright in Theory and Prac-
tice: An Improved Approach for Determining Substantial Similarity, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 277, 303
(1993) (proposing to reverse the order of the Krofft test from extrinsic/intrinsic to intrinsic/
extrinsic).
142. See, e.g., Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music
Composition Copyright Infringement, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 175 (2011) (arguing
author’s “experiment suggest[s] that the Lay Listener Test is poorly suited to weighing the
‘substantial similarity’ of musical compositions”).
143. See Lund, supra note 141.
144. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
145. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits.”).
146. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
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open-ended nature of the substantial similarity inquiry accommodates for
developing social norms while injecting community morals into a copy-
right infringement suit.147  Thus, at least in cases that solely involve literal
copying, educating the ordinary observer would hamper the fact-finder’s
normative role in a copyright infringement suit.
III. THE VARIOUS SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TESTS ARE
SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR
Part I described the context and role of the substantial similarity in-
quiry in a copyright infringement suit.  Part II argued that appellate courts
have largely been alone in developing tests for determining when an ap-
propriation passes from lawful to unlawful.  Currently, courts have devel-
oped three tests to answer this question: the ordinary observer test, the
extrinsic/intrinsic test, and the abstraction-filtration-comparison test.148
Scholars have argued that these competing tests have caused a circuit split
that should be resolved.149
This part of the Note argues that the substantial similarity’s circuit split
does not need to be “resolved.”  Although each substantial similarity test
is framed using different language, each test engages in substantially the
same, and at times exactly the same, analysis.  The substantial similarity
inquiry identifies similarities in its various degrees of generality (literal
and non-literal similarity), separates unprotected from protected material,
and compares the remaining protected expression for quantitatively and
qualitatively meaningful similarity.150  Therefore, although each test is tex-
tually different, the actual substantive inquiry is substantially the same.
This insight into the current state of the substantial similarity inquiry is not
147. See Solomon & Hannaford-Agor, supra, note 18; see also Zeisel, supra note 18;
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); THE FEDERALIST NO. 83,
supra note 18.
148. See, e.g., Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 854–56 (6th Cir. 2003) (abstraction-filtra-
tion-comparison test); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 1977) (extrinsic/intrinsic test); Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (ordi-
nary observer test).
149. See Substantial Similarity Circuit Split Analysis Materials, supra note 13.
150. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361–62
(1991).  Although the Court in Feist did not expressly follow any particular test for substan-
tial similarity, the Court effectively applied the abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis.
First, the Court separated expression into its different levels of generality. See id. The Court
differentiated the copied text and numbers from the copied organization of the text and
numbers. Id.  Second, the Court filtered out protected from unprotected expression. Id.
With respect to the literal copying of expression, the Court held that all of the Plaintiff’s text
and numbers were unprotected facts. Id. at 361.  With respect to the non-literal copying of
expression, the Court held that the plaintiff’s organization of the text and numbers was un-
protected because it was not sufficiently original. Id. at 362.  Finally, the Court did not en-
gage in a comparison analysis because, after the Court’s filtration analysis, there was nothing
left to compare. See id.  Thus, although the defendant copied a “substantial amount of fac-
tual information,” the defendant’s “use of the listings [did not] constitute infringement.” Id.
at 364.
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a novel one; this insight is what the Sixth Circuit attempted to argue in
Kohus.151
A. The Continuum of Generality
The various tests for substantial similarity can be viewed as addressing
issues that arise on a continuum of generality.152  This continuum of gen-
erality refers to the relative abstraction of expression.  On one end of the
continuum are cases that involve literal copying of expression.  The plain-
tiff claims that the defendant copied aspects like the plaintiff’s actual, ex-
act words.  If the literal copying is so comprehensive that the defendant
created an exact, or virtually exact, copy, then the substantial similarity
inquiry is short circuited—there is no genuine dispute as to actionable sim-
ilarity.153  On this end of generality, the substantial similarity inquiry plays
a much more important role when the literal copying is only of fragmented
portions of the plaintiff’s expression.154
On the opposite end of the continuum are cases that involve copying
only of ideas.  On this end of generality, the comparison step in the sub-
stantial similarity inquiry is not required because copyright does not pro-
151. See Kohus, 328 F.3d at 854-57 (6th Cir. 2003) (unifying all tests under one abstrac-
tion-filtration-comparison test).
152. See Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990).  In Nichols, Judge Hand
noted that, on the continuum of generality, there is a point where protected expression be-
comes unprotected idea:
But when the plagiarist does not take out a block in suit, but an abstract of the whole,
decision is more troublesome. Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great num-
ber of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of
what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in
this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the play-
wright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart from their expression, his
property is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody
ever can. In some cases the question has been treated as though it were analogous to
lifting a portion out of the copyrighted work; but the analogy is not a good one, because,
though the skeleton is a part of the body, it pervades and supports the whole. In such
cases we are rather concerned with the line between expression and what is expressed.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (citations omitted). In
Nash, Judge Easterbrook clarified the scope of Judge Hand’s Nichols “abstraction test.”
Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540.  Judge Easterbrook noted that “[s]ometimes called the ‘abstractions
test,’ Hand’s insight [in Nichols] is not a ‘test’ at all. It is a clever way to pose the difficulties
that require courts to avoid either extreme of the continuum of generality.” Id. (emphasis
added).
153. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY
248 (4th ed. 2015) (noting that, with respect to exact copying, “[a]bsent some defense, the
defendant will be liable for” infringement).  Comprehensive literal copying includes conduct
like pirating. See id. at 248-49 (noting two kinds of conduct: piracy and allegedly “privileged
activities”).
154. Fragmented literal similarity results from conduct like copying only small segments
of a work’s expression. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13:03(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2016).  A song that copies a short lyrical phrase from a prior song
is an example of fragmented literal similarity.
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tect ideas.155  Somewhere in between either end of the continuum of
generality are the more “troublesome” cases that involve non-literal copy-
ing of expression.156  The plaintiff claims that the defendant copied aspects
like the plaintiff’s structure and organization.157
When actually applied, each of the three discrete tests offers signifi-
cantly similar analysis.  With respect to literal copying of expression, the
three tests effectively apply the ordinary observer test.  With respect to
non-literal copying of expression, the three tests effectively apply the ab-
straction-filtration-comparison test.
1. Literal Copying of Expression
 This section evaluates how courts apply the various substantial similarity
tests in disputes over literal copying of expression.  The plaintiff is not
arguing that the defendant copied elements like the plaintiff’s work’s
structure.  The plaintiff is arguing that the defendant copied elements like
the actual text of a novel or the actual melody of a song.
Courts almost always apply the ordinary observer test to disputes over
literal copying of expression.158  Certainly, courts that follow the ordinary
observer test will apply it here.  These courts ask whether a lay spectator’s
response to the defendant’s work is such that they would recognize the
defendant’s work as appropriating “something which belongs to the plain-
tiff.”159  Some jurisdictions filter out unprotected material before the ordi-
nary observer inquiry;160 other jurisdictions include this step in the
ordinary observer inquiry itself161  In either jurisdiction, the end result is
the same: courts separate protected from unprotected material in the sub-
stantial similarity inquiry.162
Jurisdictions that follow the extrinsic/intrinsic and abstraction-filtra-
tion-comparison tests will also apply the ordinary observer test to disputes
over literal copying of expression.  As currently defined, the extrinsic/in-
trinsic test requires courts to, first, evaluate objective similarities and, sec-
ond, evaluate subjective similarities.163   First, the objective step requires
155. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361-62 (1991) (not engaging in a comparison analysis because
the defendant only copied unoriginal, noncopyrightable elements).
156. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (“when the plagiarist does not take out a block in suit,
but an abstract of the whole, decision is more troublesome”).
157. Nimmer only discusses “comprehensive” non-literal similarities. NIMMER & NIM-
MER, supra note 154, § 13:03(A)(1).  This includes conduct like copying a computer pro-
gram’s structure. See id.
158. The one exception is the intended audience test, which has extremely limited appli-
cation. See Dawson, 905 F.2d at 737.
159. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
160. See Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991).
161. See, e.g., Wildlife Exp. Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 509 (7th Cir.
1994) (citing Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.
1982))
162. See, e.g., Folio Impressions, 937 F.2d at 766; Wildlife Exp., 18 F.3d at 509–11.
163. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990).
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courts to compare non-literal similarities.164  By definition, the first step of
the extrinsic/intrinsic test is not concerned with literal similarities.  The
objective step is thus effectively bypassed in disputes over literal similari-
ties.  Second, the subjective step requires courts to ask whether a lay spec-
tator’s subjective response to the defendant’s work is such that they would
recognize the defendant’s work as appropriating “something which be-
longs to the plaintiff.”165  The subjective step is thus effectively the ordi-
nary observer test.  Therefore, in the context of literal copying of
expression, the overall effect of the extrinsic/intrinsic test is the application
of the ordinary observer test.
The abstraction-filtration-comparison test requires courts to, as the
name implies, identify a work’s various levels of abstraction, filter out any
unprotected material from each level of abstraction, and then compare the
works at issue for substantial similarity.166  When the dispute is only over
literal copying of expression, the abstraction step ends with the first level
of generality.167  The court will have no need to analyze similarity in
higher levels of generality (non-literal similarity) because there is no dis-
pute over it.168  The court will thus move directly to the filtration step and
filter out unprotected material.169  This step is akin to the more discerning
observer test.  Finally, from the remaining protected material, the court
will ask whether a lay spectator’s response to the defendant’s work is such
that they would recognize the defendant’s work as appropriating “some-
thing which belongs to the plaintiff.”170  Thus, in the context of literal cop-
ying of expression, the overall effect of the abstraction-filtration-
comparison test is the application of the ordinary observer test.
The key take-away here is that courts throughout the U.S. are applying
the ordinary observer test to disputes over literal similarities.  The analysis
164. Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2002) (including simi-
larities in “subject matter, shapes, colors, materials, and arrangement.”).
165. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473; Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822 (explaining that the “intrinsic
test” is a subjective comparison that focuses on “whether the ordinary, reasonable audience”
would find the works substantially similar in the “total concept and feel of the works”).
166. Altai, 982 F.2d at 706.
167. See, e.g., Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1373 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[w]here, as
here, the alleged infringement constitutes the admitted literal copying of a discrete, easily-
conceptualized portion of a work, we need not perform complete abstraction-filtration-com-
parison analysis.”); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1357 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“this full [abstraction] analysis only applies where a copyright owner alleges infringement of
the non-literal aspects of its work”).
168. See Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1373 (“Where, as here, the alleged infringement constitutes
the admitted literal copying of a discrete, easily-conceptualized portion of a work, we need
not perform complete abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis”).
169. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1357 n.4 (when literal copying admitted, a court “may focus the
protectability analysis on the filtration stage, with attendant reference to standard copyright
principles”).
170. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473; Country Kids , 77 F.3d at 1288 (“In this context, we
believe the ‘ordinary observer’ test is an appropriate method for the court to use in its com-
parison analysis”).
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in the extrinsic/intrinsic test and abstraction-filtration-comparison test col-
lapses into the final subjective comparison of literal similarities, which is
the ordinary observer test.
2. Non-Literal Copying of Expression
This section evaluates how courts have both developed and applied the
various substantial similarity tests in disputes over non-literal copying of
expression.  The copying at issue is not over the actual text of a novel or
the actual melody of a song.  Instead, the copying at issue is over the rela-
tively more abstract aspects of a work, such as plot, themes, and structure.
Although the ordinary observer test works remarkably well when com-
paring literal similarities, the ordinary observer test is not without fault.
Its efficacy starts to break down when the plaintiff claims non-literal copy-
ing of expression, particularly when the works at issue have significant
similarities in unprotected expression.171  How would a lay, reasonable
spectator identify similarity in the general structure of computer code?  As
traditionally framed (without the more discerning observer test), the ordi-
nary observer test has the risk of protecting unprotected material.172
Thus, the fundamental issue here is how to distinguish idea from expres-
sion and ensure that the court only protects the latter.
Courts in their analysis do not always speak in terms of Altai’s abstrac-
tion-filtration-comparison test.  Courts, however, effectively apply the
three steps in the context of disputes over non-literal copying of expres-
sion.173  Certainly, courts in jurisdictions that follow the abstraction-filtra-
tion-comparison test apply it here.  As the name implies, courts first
identify expression in its different levels of generality.174  Courts then fil-
ter out elements that are not protected.175  Finally, courts compare the
remaining protected expression from the perspective of an ordinary ob-
server.176  In the context of select works with highly specialized audiences,
such as a computer program, some courts refine the perspective of com-
parison to the intended audience.177
Jurisdictions that follow the ordinary observer and extrinsic/intrinsic
tests in effect apply the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to disputes
over non-literal copying of expression.  Depending on the jurisdiction,
courts that follow the ordinary observer test will either filter out unpro-
171. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (describing that the determination of a copying of “an
abstract of the whole” is “more troublesome”).
172. See PATRY, supra note 34 (arguing the more discerning observer test narrows the
ordinary observer test to only comparing protected expression).
173. See generally Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
174. Altai, 982 F.2d at 706–07.
175. Id. at 707–10.
176. Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (“In this context, we
believe the ‘ordinary observer’ test is an appropriate method for the court to use in its com-
parison analysis”).
177. See, e.g., Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 857 (6th Cir. 2003).
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tected material before the ordinary observer inquiry178 or during the ordi-
nary observer inquiry itself179  Courts then apply the ordinary observer
test using a “total look and feel” analysis.180  The trier of fact must still
consider the work as a whole when evaluating whether a lay spectator’s
response to the defendant’s work is such that they would recognize the
defendant’s work as appropriating “something which belongs to the plain-
tiff.”181  Albeit messy, the ultimate effect of the ordinary observer test is
to identify expression in higher levels of abstraction (aided by the added
“total look and feel” analysis), filter out unprotected material (aided by
the more discerning observer test), and compare the remaining expression
for similarity.
As currently defined, the extrinsic/intrinsic test requires courts to, first,
evaluate objective similarities and, second, evaluate subjective similari-
ties.182  First, the objective step requires courts to compare non-literal sim-
ilarities.183  Courts evaluate similarities in aspects like a work’s shape,
color, material, and general arrangement.184  Courts engage in analytic
dissection to separate protected from unprotected material.185  This allows
the court to determine whether or not the abstract level of expression is
itself protected.  If it is, the court will move on to the subjective step.  Sec-
ond, the subjective step requires courts to ask whether a lay spectator’s
subjective response to the defendant’s work is such that they would recog-
nize the defendant’s work as appropriating “something which belongs to
the plaintiff.”186  The overall effect of the extrinsic/intrinsic test is thus to
identify expression in higher levels of abstraction, filter out unprotected
material, and compare the remaining expression for similarity.
Feist is a prominent example of a court applying the abstraction-filtra-
tion-comparison test without expressly stating that it was adopting any sort
of substantial similarity test.  In Feist, the works at issue were telephone
directories.187  The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had copied the
plaintiff’s selection and arrangement of telephone numbers.188  This or-
178. See, e.g., Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir.
1991).
179. See, e.g., Wildlife Exp. Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 50-09 (7th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614
(7th Cir. 1982)).
180. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995).
181. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
182. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990).
183. Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2002)
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473; Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822 (“The ‘intrinsic test’ is a subjec-
tive comparison that focuses on ‘whether the ordinary, reasonable audience’ would find the
works substantially similar in the ‘total concept and feel of the works.’ ”).
187. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 342-43(1991).
188. Id.  Or, as Nimmer calls it, “comprehensive non-literal similarity.” NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 154, § 13:03(A)(1).
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ganization was the work’s second level of abstraction.189  The Court in
Feist filtered out unprotected material in this higher level of abstraction.190
The Court held that, because the organization was not sufficiently original,
it was ineligible for copyright protection.191  Because there was no further
expression left to compare, the Court held that, although the defendant
appropriated a “substantial amount of factual information,” the defendant
was not liable for copyright infringement.192  Thus, the Court had no need
to apply the ordinary observer test in the final comparison step.
Finally, empirical data suggests that whatever distinction there is be-
tween circuits, it is one without a difference.193  In an exhaustive study of
all appellate court cases between 1970 and 2010, Katherine Lippman
found that “the three main tests—the ordinary observer test, the extrinsic/
intrinsic test, and the abstraction-filtration-comparison test—their sub-
stantial similarity win rates become closely aligned.”194  In other words,
whether substantial similarity is evaluated in the Sixth Circuit, the Second
Circuit, or the Ninth Circuit, the end result will very likely be the same.195
B. Kohus Got It Right
This section of the Note argues that the court in Kohus got it right.  In
adopting a “new” substantial similarity test, the Sixth Circuit unified Feist
with prior case law in a single, clean form of analysis.
The plaintiff in Kohus alleged that the defendant had infringed the
plaintiff’s technical drawings of a collapsible playyard.196  After rejecting
both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s expert witnesses’ testimony, the
trial court “concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find that the
Defendants’ drawings were substantially similar to the [Plaintiff’s] draw-
ing, and held that since Kohus’s substantial similarity argument failed, his
derivative copying argument should also fail.”197  Thus, the trial court
merely applied the ordinary observer test.
Prior to Kohus, the Sixth Circuit had yet to adopt a specific test for
substantial similarity.198  The Sixth Circuit changed that in Kohus.  The
court noted that its “criteria in establishing a test” for substantial similarity
189. On the first level of abstraction (the literal similarities), the plaintiff’s telephone
directory was a listing of telephone numbers. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.  The phone numbers
were ineligible for copyright protection because they “existed before Rural reported them
and would have continued to exist if Rural had never published a telephone directory.” Id.
190. Id. at 362.
191. Id. at 362-63.
192. Id. at 361, 363-64.




196. Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2003).
197. Id. at 853.
198. Id. at 854 (quoting Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506 n.2 (6th Cir.1999)).
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was “faithfulness to the law—to Feist, and to [its] prior caselaw insofar as
it [was] consistent with Feist—and workability.”199  The court read Feist as
acknowledging an initial step in the substantial similarity inquiry: filtering
out unprotected, unoriginal material.200  From this, the court held that the
first step in its test for substantial similarity was to filter out unprotected
material from each level of abstraction.201
The court listed various kinds of elements that a court needs to filter
out, including “elements that were not independently created . . . , and that
possess no minimal degree of creativity.”202  Elements that were “dictated
by efficiency” or had otherwise merged with idea should be filtered out.203
Similarly, the court required courts to filter out “scenes a faire,” which the
court defined as elements that flow naturally from external factors, such as
business practices.204
The court noted that, once unprotected expression is filtered out from
the various levels of abstraction, a court must compare the remaining orig-
inal expression for substantial similarity.205  With regard to the compari-
son step, the Court held as follows:
[T]he substantial similarity test should focus on the intended audience. This
will ordinarily be the lay public, in which case the finder of fact’s judgment
should be from the perspective of the lay observer or, as Monogram Models
put it, the ordinary reasonable person. But in cases where the audience for the
work possesses specialized expertise that is relevant to the purchasing decision
and lacking in the lay observer, the trier of fact should make the substantial
similarity determination from the perspective of the intended audience. Ex-
pert testimony will usually be necessary to educate the trier of fact in those
elements for which the specialist will look.206
That said, the court heavily limited the departure from the traditional or-
dinary observer test.  The court held that in order to depart from the per-
spective of the lay observer, the intended audience’s specialized expertise
“must go beyond mere differences in taste and instead must rise to the
level of the possession of knowledge that the lay public lacks.”207
199. Id.
200. Id. at 855
201. Id. at 855-56.
202. Id. at 855.
203. Id. at 856.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 857.
207. Id. (citing Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir.1990)).  Such
limited application of the intended audience test makes doctrinal sense in the context of the
ordinary observer test’s genesis.  The ordinary observer test was initially created on the as-
sumption that copyrights are “made for plain people.”  Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692
(2d Cir. 1926).  Here, the Sixth Circuit replaced the ordinary observer test with the intended
audience test.  However, as the Sixth Circuit made clear, this departure only actually applies
in situations where the copyright was not made for plain people, such as in the context of
computer programs. See Kohus, 328 F.3d at 857.  In other words, the ordinary observer test
has always been the intended audience test, but prior to the technological innovation of com-
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Scholars have largely ignored the Kohus test.  Most scholars have only
referenced the Kohus test in passing, noting that the Sixth Circuit follows
some form of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test.208  Willaim Patry
has offered one of the few substantive critiques against Kohus.209  Patry
argues that the abstraction-filtration-comparison test is unnecessary.210
Anything past the traditional ordinary observer test, Patry argues, is su-
perfluous, or, as Patry puts it, by fixating “on the pine cones of the trees,
[Kohus] misses the forest.”211  Moreover, Patry argues that Kohus “does
violence to basic principles of copyright law hitherto simply expressed and
well-understood, while imposing inflated costs on the litigants and the dis-
trict courts (in time), all toward a result that is sure to be further away
from the truth of the matter at hand.”212
Patry raises valid points.  First, Patry argues that the Kohus abstrac-
tion-filtration-comparison test is more expensive than the ordinary ob-
server test.213  It is important to note, however, that courts, including the
Sixth Circuit, that apply the abstraction-filtration-comparison test do not
always engage in a full abstraction analysis.214  If the dispute is merely
over simple literal copying, the abstraction analysis will end with the first
level of generality.215  An abstraction analysis is not needed past that first
level of generality because there is no dispute over non-literal similarities.
The court will then engage in an analysis extremely similar to the modern
ordinary observer test.  Thus, to the extent that the Kohus test is more
expensive than the ordinary observer test, it is only more expensive in
disputes over complex non-literal copying of expression.  Further, even
there, it is unlikely that the Kohus test is actually more expensive than the
ordinary observer test.  As noted above, the ordinary observer test also
puters and the recognition of programming’s copyrightability, Courts have never needed to
speak in terms of the “intended audience.”
208. See Lemley, supra note 13, at 26; but see PATRY, supra note 34, § 9:193 (engaging
in extensive discussion of Kohus); William A. Hall, Copyright-Kohus v. Mariol: The Sixth
Circuit Adopts Two-Step Test for Substantial Similarity in Copyright Infringement, 34 U.
Mem. L. Rev. 995, 1007 (2004).
209. PATRY, supra note 34, § 9:193.
210. Id.  (“In 2003, the circuit took a giant step toward incomprehensibility, with its ‘big
opinion’ in Kohus v. Mariol, an opinion that not only created a conflict between a Supreme
Court opinion (Feist) and a fundamental concept of copyright law (the ordinary-observer-
test) where none existed, but then ‘solved’ the conflict by creating a test that cobbles together
disparate elements that are not related to each other and which, not surprisingly, will not
work together.”).
211. Id. § 9:70.
212. Id. § 9:203.
213. Id.
214. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1357 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“this full
[abstraction] analysis only applies where a copyright owner alleges infringement of the non-
literal aspects of its work”).
215. Id.
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engages in a sort of abstraction-filtration analysis in the form of the more
discerning observer test.216
Second, Patry argues that the abstraction-filtration-comparison test is
much more involved than merely asking whether a lay spectator’s re-
sponse to the allegedly infringing work is such that they recognize the de-
fendant’s work as appropriating something from the plaintiff’s work.217
Aside from simple literal copying, however, no court—not even the Sec-
ond Circuit—merely applies the traditional ordinary observer test.  In a
dispute over works that have significant similarities in unprotected mate-
rial, the Second Circuit will engage in the more discerning observer test to
filter out that unoriginal, unprotected material.  In this regard, the Kohus
test has an advantage over the modern ordinary observer test.  Relative to
the Kohus test, the modern ordinary observer test is messy. Kohus cor-
rects this messiness with a clean method.
Finally, Patry argues that the Kohus abstraction-filtration-comparison
test will lead to results that are “sure to be further away from the truth of
the matter at hand.”218   Empirical data, however, suggests the oppo-
site.219  Whether the substantial similarity inquiry is presented to the Sixth
Circuit or the Second Circuit, the end result will very likely be the same.220
Overall, the Sixth Circuit’s Kohus test does not call for a different substan-
tive analysis than other circuits.  To the contrary, the Kohus test embraces
the similarity in the various substantial similarity tests.
CONCLUSION
 Copying is the basis for new expression.221  But how much copying is too
much copying?  Since copyright law’s inception, courts have developed the
doctrine of substantial similarity to answer that question.  Tracking the
technological advancement of radio, movies, television, sound recordings,
and computers, courts have continuously molded the substantial similarity
inquiry to match the social norms of the times.  From this historical pro-
gress, courts have identified that substantial similarity embraces both
quantitative and qualitative aspects.222
However, because Congress and the Supreme Court have been silent
on the matter, lower courts have largely been alone in developing tests to
determine exactly when a work is sufficiently quantitatively or qualita-
tively similar.  Thus far, courts have established three discrete tests for
substantial similarity in the U.S.: the ordinary observer test, the extrinsic/
216. See Folio Impressions 937 F.2d at 766.
217. PATRY, supra note 34, § 9:203.
218. Id.
219. See Lippmann, supra note 11.
220. Id.
221. See Sanchez, supra note 3.
222. See Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675-76 (1878) (holding the substantiality in-
quiry includes a materiality requirement)
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intrinsic test, and the abstraction-filtration-comparison test.223  Scholars
have argued that this circuit split should be resolved with a uniform test.224
Each substantial similarity test, however,  engages in substantially the
same, and at times exactly the same, analysis.  Moreover, empirical data
suggests that the different tests for substantial similarity do not even lead
to different outcomes.225  What copyright commentators have identified as
a circuit split in need of resolving is in fact a variety of formulations of a
common test.  The Sixth Circuit recognized this when it embraced the sim-
ilarity in the various substantial similarity tests.226  In this respect, the
Sixth Circuit in Kohus got it right.
223. See, e.g., Lippmann, supra note 11.
224. Id. at 515.
225. See id. at 545 (“Remarkably, however, when collapsing the six substantial similar-
ity tests into the three main tests—the ordinary observer test, the extrinsic/intrinsic test, and
the abstraction-filtration-comparison test—their substantial similarity win rates become
closely aligned.”).
226. See Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 853-57 (6th Cir. 2003).
